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The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes the
structure of the intermediate industry as exogenously given. This paper
endogenizes the structure of the intermediate industry and examines the
eﬀects of banning third-degree price discrimination on market structure
and welfare. We identify situations where banning price discrimination
leads to either higher or lower prices for all downstream ﬁrms. These
ﬁndings are driven by the fact that upstream proﬁts are discontinuous due
to entry being costly. Moreover, permitting price discrimination fosters
entry which in many cases improves welfare. Nevertheless, entry can also
reduce welfare because it may lead to a severe ineﬃciency in production.
JEL classiﬁcation: D43; L11; L42
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1 Introduction
“There are several ways in which the [upstream] manufacturer may inﬂuence the number
of [downstream] retailers. [...] [T]he manufacturer may indirectly control the number of
dealers through his pricing policy [...] .”
— Michael L. Katz (1989)
∗We have beneﬁted from comments made by Matthias Kr¨ akel, Urs Schweizer, and Philipp Wein-
schenk. All errors are of course our own.
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‡University of Bonn, Department of Economics, Chair of Business Administration II, Adenauer-
allee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, E-mail address: daniel.mueller@uni-bonn.de (correspond-
ing author).2 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
An ubiquitous assumption in the extant theory on third-degree price discrimi-
nation in input markets is that the structure of the intermediate industry is rigid.
Abstracting from entry into the intermediate industry ignores the fact that pricing
decisions of the upstream supplier are a major determinant of the resulting industry
structure and market outcome. These pricing decisions in turn are determined by
the pricing instruments available to the upstream supplier, in particular whether
price discrimination is feasible or not. In this paper, we endogenize the structure of
the intermediate industry and examine the eﬀects of banning price discrimination
in input markets on industry structure and welfare.
Our modeling assumptions are shared by a large part of the extant literature: an
monopolistic upstream ﬁrm supplies an input that is used by ﬁrms in an intermediate
industry to produce a ﬁnal product. The upstream supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-
it oﬀer to each of the downstream ﬁrms, specifying a per-unit wholesale price at
which that ﬁrm can procure any desired quantity of the input. The new feature in
our model is that one of the downstream ﬁrms has yet to decide whether to incur a
strictly positive entry cost in order to become active in the intermediate industry.
If downstream ﬁrms operate in separate markets and if the entry cost imposes a
binding restriction on the choice of wholesale prices under either regime, then, de-
pending on the relative eﬃciency of the potential entrant, price discrimination can
lead to lower or higher wholesale prices for all downstream ﬁrms compared to uniform
pricing. This immediately translates into price discrimination being strictly welfare
enhancing or welfare reducing, respectively. Irrespective of whether downstream
ﬁrms operate in separate markets or compete in the same market, price discrimi-
nation fosters entry. With separate downstream markets, opening of a new market
under price discrimination but not under uniform pricing is a suﬃcient condition for
a ban on price discrimination to be welfare harming. If downstream ﬁrms compete ` a
la Cournot, then entry alleviates the distortion arising from double marginalization.
Under discriminatory wholesale pricing, however, this beneﬁcial eﬀect of entry can
be oﬀset by entry being costly and an allocative ineﬃciency in production induced
by the upstream supplier’s discrimination against the more eﬃcient ﬁrm.
The theoretical debate about the welfare eﬀects of banning third-degree price dis-
crimination in intermediate-goods markets was initiated by Katz (1987). His seminal
paper considers a vertically related industry where the upstream market is monopo-
lized and the downstream industry consists of a large chain that competes in several
downstream markets with a small local store. Katz shows that permitting price dis-
crimination reduces welfare unless it prevents ineﬃcient backward integration by the
chain of stores. The ﬁnding of Katz is generalized by DeGraba (1990) to a long-runPrice Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 3
analysis where downstream ﬁrms can invest in cost reduction. Here, a ban on price
discrimination does not only increase welfare in the short run, but also is beneﬁcial
in the long run. The reason is that the more eﬃcient downstream ﬁrm is charged a
higher wholesale price under price discrimination than under uniform pricing. Thus,
under price discrimination the beneﬁt of lower production costs is partially oﬀset
by a higher wholesale price, which reduces a ﬁrm’s investment incentives. Yoshida
(2000) extends the previous models to the case where downstream ﬁrms operate
with Leontief-type technologies.1
More recent contributions relax the assumption that the upstream ﬁrm has all
the bargaining power. Inderst and Valetti (2009) posit that downstream ﬁrms have
access to an alternative source of input supply. In their model the more eﬃcient
ﬁrm receives a discount. In consequence, price discrimination provides higher incen-
tives to invest in cost reduction and thus—at least for linear demand—can result
in higher welfare than uniform pricing. While Inderst and Valetti still assume that
the upstream ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, O’Brien (forthcoming) assumes
that the wholesale prices are determined by Nash bargaining. This also gives rise to
circumstances where banning price discrimination is socially harmful.
Last, O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1994) and Inderst and Shaﬀer (2009) relax the assump-
tion that the upstream supplier is restricted to linear wholesale prices and allow for
two-part tariﬀs. In O’Brien and Shaﬀer, while a ban on price discrimination may
beneﬁt downstream ﬁrms, it always does so at the expense of consumers and total
welfare.2 In the setting of Inderst and Shaﬀer (2009), optimal wholesale prices are
shown to amplify diﬀerences in downstream ﬁrms’ competitiveness. A ban on price
discrimination in consequence reduces allocative eﬃciency and may lead to higher
wholesale prices for all downstream ﬁrms, resulting in lower welfare.
All the aforementioned papers take the structure of the intermediate industry as
exogenously given. This paper, in contrast, endogenizes the structure of the inter-
mediate industry by allowing for costly entry, and derives implications of banning
price discrimination for industry structure, consumers’ surplus, and welfare.3 As
was ﬁrst reasoned by Bork (1978), allowing a ﬁnal-good monopolist to price dis-
1Valetti (2003) generalizes the results obtained in Yoshida (2000) beyond the case of linear de-
mand.
2Analyzing a similar model but assuming that the upstream ﬁrm competes against a fringe,
Caprice (2006) shows that banning price discrimination may cause welfare to increase.
3 In a linear demand model, Haucap and Wey (2007) also consider endogeneity of market structure
in intermediate good markets. Abstracting from any real entry decision in the sense of incuring
an entry cost, their ﬁndings, in contrast to our results, closely parallel the ﬁndings for ﬁnal-good
markets.4 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
criminate can lead to more markets being served, which in turn improves welfare.4
This entry-promoting and in turn welfare-improving eﬀect of price discrimination
is also operative in our model. But even when all markets are served under either
pricing regime, we derive circumstances where price discrimination leads to either
overall higher or overall lower prices than uniform pricing. These cases arise from
entry being costly and do not crucially rely on any assumptions on the demand
function. Thus, in a nutshell, the welfare implications of banning third-degree price
discrimination with an endogenous market structure for ﬁnal-good markets do not
extend to the case of intermediate-good markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our model
with downstream ﬁrms operating in separate markets. This model is analyzed for the
cases of a less eﬃcient entrant and a more eﬃcient entrant in Section 3 and Section 4,
respectively. Section 5 introduces Cournot competition between downstream ﬁrms.
We conclude in Section 6.
2 A Model of Separate Markets
Consider a vertically related industry where the upstream market is monopolized by
ﬁrm U. The upstream monopolist produces an essential input that is supplied to a
downstream sector. For simplicity we assume that U produces without costs. There
are potentially two downstream ﬁrms, i ∈ {I,E}, that transform one unit of input
into one unit of a ﬁnal good. While ﬁrm I, the incumbent, is already active in the
downstream industry, ﬁrm E, the entrant, has to expend an entry cost F > 0 to
become active in the downstream industry. Downstream ﬁrm i produces at constant
marginal cost ki ∈ {0,k}, k > 0, and without ﬁxed cost.
The sequence of events is as follows: First, U can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
each downstream ﬁrm.5 Under price discrimination, U oﬀers each downstream ﬁrm
a possibly diﬀerent wholesale price wi, whereas under uniform pricing the same price
wi = w applies to both ﬁrms.6 Thus, upon accepting U’s oﬀer, downstream ﬁrm i’s
4This ﬁnding is formally established by Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988).
5The assumption of the upstream supplier having all the bargaining power, “which arguably can
be justiﬁed on the grounds that for antitrust purposes the considerations of price discrimination
in intermediate-goods markets is primarily relevant if the supplier enjoys a dominant position”
(Inderst and Shaﬀer, 2009, p.4) is common in the extant literature. Exceptions are O’Brien
and Shaﬀer (1994) and O’Brien (forthcoming).
6In restricting the upstream supplier to linear wholesale contracts we follow Katz (1987), DeGraba
(1990), Yoshida (2000), O’Brien (forthcoming), and Inderst and Valetti (2009, forthcoming).
Though obviously restrictive, this assumption“can be defended on grounds of possible realism”,
as argued in Inderst and Valetti (2009, forthcoming). From a theoretical perspective, Iyer and
Villas-Boas (2003) and Milliou et al. (2004) provide some support for the use of linear wholesale
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eﬀective marginal cost is ci = wi + ki. In stage two, after observing the contracts
oﬀered by U, ﬁrm E decides whether or not to enter the downstream industry at
cost F > 0. In stage three, all active ﬁrms in the downstream industry purchase a
nonnegative quantity of the input from U, transform this input into the ﬁnal good,
and sell the produced output to consumers. We abstract from any commitment
problems and assume that U can credibly commit to the prices quoted in this ﬁrst
stage.7
First, we focus on the case where the downstream ﬁrms serve independent markets.
We assume that both markets are symmetric and thus characterized by the same
inverse demand function P(q). The inverse demand function is assumed to be strictly
decreasing and thrice diﬀerentiable where P > 0. Moreover, we impose the standard
assumption P ′(q) < min{0,−qP ′′(q)} where P > 0.8 The equilibrium concept
employed is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
We impose an additional assumption that ensures that U’s maximization problem
is well-behaved under either pricing regime.
Assumption (A1): Downstream marginal revenue is concave, 3P ′′(q)+qP ′′′(q) ≤
0, whenever P > 0.
Next to technical issues, there is another reason for this assumption: as was shown by
Katz (1987), if downstream ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition, then under price
discrimination the downstream ﬁrm with the lower marginal cost will be charged
a higher wholesale price than the downstream ﬁrm with the higher marginal cost.9
The ﬁrm with lower own marginal cost has the more inelastic demand for the input,
which causes the supplier to charge this ﬁrm a higher price. While the peculiarity of
Cournot competition that total output only depends on the sum of eﬀective marginal
cost allows Katz (1987) to obtain this result in considerable generality, this is not
possible in the case of separate markets. Here, Assumption (A1) provides a suﬃcient
condition for the demand of the more eﬃcient downstream ﬁrm being less elastic,
which in turn implies that price discrimination results in a higher wholesale price for
the more eﬃcient ﬁrm. Thus, next to reasons of analytical convenience, we impose
this assumption in order to maintain comparability to the earlier models of price
outcome when upstream and downstream ﬁrms can bargain over the form of their contractual
arrangement.
7At a later point we make clear, which of our results are driven by this assumption.
8 See, for example, Vives (1999).
9This result, which is also obtained by DeGraba (1990) and Yoshida (2000), holds as long as there
are no additional restrictions on the input supplier’s price setting, such as backward integration
into the production process by downstream ﬁrms considered by Katz (1987) or demand-side
substitution considered by Inderst and Valetti (2009, forthcoming).6 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
discrimination in input markets.
In order to state our results as concise as possible, we restrict attention to sit-
uations where U considers it optimal to serve both ﬁrms under uniform pricing at
least for suﬃciently small entry cost. A suﬃcient condition for this is that the less
eﬃcient ﬁrm is not too ineﬃcient in the sense that it demands a strictly positive
quantity when charged the optimal discriminatory wholesale price wd(0) for the
more eﬃcient ﬁrm. Formally, letting the optimal quantity produced by an active
downstream ﬁrm i be denoted by q(ci) := argmaxq {q[P(q) − ci]}, we impose the
following assumption:
Assumption (A2): Marginal cost k is such that q(wd(0) + k) > 0.
As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that U serves only the incumbent market when
indiﬀerent between the two possible structures the intermediate industry can take.
3 The Analysis
In this section, it is assumed that the potential entrant is less eﬃcient than the
incumbent, i.e., 0 = kI < kE = k. As a preliminary consideration, note that an
active downstream ﬁrm in stage 3 realizes gross proﬁts π(ci) := q(ci)[P(q(ci)) − ci],
and that both q(ci) and π(ci) are strictly decreasing in eﬀective marginal cost ci
where q > 0. Firm E will enter the intermediate industry if and only if its proﬁts in
stage 3 exceed the entry cost, i.e., iﬀ π(wE + k) ≥ F. In all that follows, we focus
on the case where F is not too high,
F < π(k) =: ˜ F(k), (1)
such that there are positive gains from trade to be realized between U and ﬁrm E.
Nevertheless, the entry constraint may impose a restriction on U in its setting of
wholesale prices.
3.1 Optimal Wholesale Pricing
First, suppose that F is suﬃciently low such that the entry constraint is not binding.




w {wq(w + ki)}. (2)
Under uniform pricing, U chooses the common wholesale price
w
u(k) := argmax
w {wq(w + k) + wq(w)}. (3)Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 7
We now can establish the following result: if U is unrestricted in its choice of whole-
sale prices under both regimes, then the optimal uniform wholesale price is bracketed
by the two discriminatory prices. More precisely, under discrimination the less eﬃ-
cient ﬁrm receives a discount compared to uniform pricing. This discount, however,
does not outweigh its cost disadvantage.
Lemma 1: Given (A1) and (A2), then wd(k) < wu(k) < wd(0) < wd(k) + k.
Under either pricing regime, if the entry fee is high, then charging the optimal
unrestricted wholesale price(s) leads to a violation of ﬁrm E’s entry constraint.
Letting ¯ F j(k) denote the highest value the entry fee can take such that U is not
restricted in its price setting under pricing regime j ∈ {d,u}, we have
¯ F
u(k) := π(w
u(k) + k) and ¯ F
d(k) := π(w
d(k) + k). (4)
From Lemma 1 and (1) it follows immediately that ¯ F u(k) < ¯ F d(k) < ˜ F(k).
In order to induce entry, U optimally charges ﬁrm E wholesale price wR at which
ﬁrm E is indiﬀerent between entering and staying out of the intermediate industry.
Wholesale price wR is implicitly deﬁned by
π(w
R + k) ≡ F. (5)
Obviously, wR = wR(F;k) is strictly decreasing in F.
Under price discrimination it is optimal to oﬀer wholesale price wR to ﬁrm E as
long as positive gains from trade are to be realized between U and ﬁrm E, i.e., for
F < ˜ F(k). When restricted to a uniform wholesale price, U has to pass-through
this discount price wR also to ﬁrm I. If the entry cost only slightly exceeds ¯ F u(k),
it remains optimal for U to serve both downstream ﬁrms just as in the case where
the entry cost does not restrict wholesale pricing. Since wR is strictly decreasing in
F, if the entry cost exceeds some critical threshold ˆ F, U prefers serving only ﬁrm I
at wholesale price wd(0). Formally, ˆ F is implicitly deﬁned by
w
R( ˆ F;k)[q(w
R( ˆ F;k) + k) + q(w
R( ˆ F;k))] = w
d(0)q(w
d(0)). (6)
Obviously, ˆ F = ˆ F(k). From wR( ¯ F u(k);k) ≡ wu(k) together with wR(F;k) tending
to zero as F tends to ˜ F(k), it follows that ¯ F u(k) < ˆ F(k) < ˜ F(k).
Letting wholesale prices in equilibrium be denoted by {wd
E,wd
I} and wu under
price discrimination and uniform pricing, respectively, allows us to summarize the
above discussion as follows:
Observation 1: In equilibrium, the optimal wholesale price(s)8 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
(i) under price discrimination are wd
E = wd(k) for 0 < F ≤ ¯ F d(k), wd
E =
wR(F;k) for ¯ F d(k) < F < ˜ F(k), and wd
I = wd(0).
(ii) under uniform pricing is wu = wu(k) for 0 < F ≤ ¯ F u(k), wu = wR(F;k) for
¯ F u(k) < F < ˆ F(k), and wu = wd(0) for ˆ F(k) ≤ F < ˜ F(k).
3.2 Welfare Implications of Banning Price Discrimination
The measure of total welfare applied in this paper is the unweighted sum of consumer
and producer surplus. We express changes in economic variables due to a regime
shift from uniform pricing to price discrimination using symbol ∆. If both ﬁrms are












E + k) − q(w
u + k)]. (7)
To compare the two pricing regimes one needs a complete ordering of the entry
cost’s critical threshold levels. With the relationship between ¯ F d(k) and ˆ F(k) be-
ing undetermined in general, there are two possible orderings of the thresholds as
depicted in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1]
It is important to note that ceteris paribus entry into the downstream industry is
always beneﬁcial from a welfare point of view, since E enters only if it generates a
surplus that exceeds the entry cost. Letting Qr denote the total quantity sold under
pricing regime r ∈ {d,u}, the following welfare implications are readily obtained.
Proposition 1: Given (A1) and (A2), if
(i) F < min{ ˆ F(k), ¯ F d(k)}, then ∆Q ≤ 0 implies ∆W < 0.
(ii) ¯ F d(k) ≤ F < ˆ F(k), then ∆W < 0.
(iii) ˆ F(k) ≤ F < ˜ F(k), then ∆W > 0.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. For low values of the entry fee, in case
(i), entry occurs under both pricing regimes. With the uniform wholesale price
lying strictly between the two discriminatory wholesale prices, a clear welfare result
is not to obtain. Nevertheless, we can derive a suﬃcient condition for permitting
price discrimination to reduce welfare: if total output under price discrimination
is not higher than total output under uniform pricing, then welfare under pricePrice Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 9
discrimination is strictly lower than welfare under uniform pricing. This ﬁnding
clearly parallels Schmalensee’s (1981) result on third-degree price discrimination in
ﬁnal-good markets.10
For high values of the entry fee, i.e., in case (iii), price discrimination fosters
entry which in turn improves welfare. With entry occurring only if discriminatory
pricing is permitted, the market outcome and thus welfare in the incumbent market is
independent of the pricing regime, whereas welfare in the entrant’s market is strictly
positive only under price discrimination. This obviously is the intermediate-market
analogue to Hausman and MacKie-Mason’s (1988) ﬁnding on price discrimination
in ﬁnal-good markets.
Case (ii), on the other hand, embodies a novelty. For intermediate values of the
entry fee both downstream ﬁrms are served under either pricing regime. With the
upstream supplier being restricted in its price setting under both pricing regimes,
the entrant receives wholesale price wR irrespectively of the regime. This low whole-
sale price is passed on to the incumbent ﬁrm only under uniform pricing but not
under price discrimination. In consequence, welfare in the entrant’s market is un-
changed when permitting price discrimination but welfare in the incumbent’s market
is strictly reduced. Thus, even though market-opening occurs under both pricing
regimes, price discrimination is unambiguously found to be detrimental for welfare.11
A Linear Demand Application: Suppose P(q) = max{1 − q,0}, which satisﬁes
(A1), and 0 < k < 1, which relaxes (A2). The proﬁt of an active downstream ﬁrm is
π(ci) = (1−ci)2/4. If U is unrestricted by the entry constraint, the optimal wholesale
prices are wd(ki) = (1 − ki)/2 and wu(k) = (2 − k)/4 under price discrimination
and under uniform pricing, respectively. The wholesale price that makes ﬁrm E
indiﬀerent between entering and staying out is wR = 1 − k − 2
√
F. It can be
shown that ˆ F(k) > ¯ F d(k) if and only if k > 1/2, where ˆ F(k) = (1/64)[2 − 3k +
4
√
k2 − 4k + 2]2. Since we have not imposed (A2) there exists a critical marginal
cost ¯ k such that under uniform pricing U optimally serves only ﬁrm I if k > ¯ k even
for F = 0.
[Insert Figure 2]
10A series of papers elaborates on Schmalensee’s basic insight, see Varian (1981), Schwartz (1990),
and Malueg (1993). For extensive overviews on price discrimination in ﬁnal-good markets, see
Armstrong (2007) and Stole (2007).
11Note that case (ii) exists only if ¯ Fd(k) < ˆ F(k). The eﬀect arising in case (ii) depends on the
upstream supplier’s ability to commit to its oﬀers. If commitment is not possible and the entry
decision is made before wholesale prices are set, then for F > ¯ Fd(k) entry occurs under neither
pricing regime.10 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
Figure 2 depicts the critical thresholds for ﬁrm E’s marginal cost k and the entry
cost F, where for illustrative purposes we rephrased the thresholds in terms of
√
F. As is well-known, with linear demand total output is the same under price
discrimination and uniform pricing, given that the entry constraint does not impose a
binding restriction. Hence, according to Proposition 1(i), for low values of F banning
price discrimination improves welfare. This case corresponds to the white area on
the left bottom of Figure 2. The dark gray shaded area of Figure 2 corresponds
to case (ii) of Proposition 1. Here, permitting price discrimination is harmful for
total welfare. On the other hand, in the light gray shaded area price discrimination
encourages entry which in turn supports welfare, case (iii) of Proposition 1.
4 More Efficient Entrant
Suppose the entrant is more eﬃcient than the incumbent, 0 = kE < kI = k. Oth-
erwise the model is the same as before: in particular (A1) and (A2) hold and
F < π(0) =: ˜ F(0). Lemma 1 immediately implies that the unrestricted uniform
wholesale price is bracketed by the two unrestricted discriminatory wholesale prices,
with the less eﬃcient ﬁrm I receiving a discount under price discrimination.
If discriminatory oﬀers are allowed, U charges wholesale price wd(k) from ﬁrm
I. The wholesale price oﬀered to ﬁrm E depends on whether the entry constraint
imposes a binding restriction. If the entry constraint is slack, U sets wd
E = wd(0). If
the entry fee exceeds ¯ F d(0) := π(wd(0)), the entry constraint becomes binding and
U charges wd
E = wR(F;0) implicitly deﬁned by π(wR(F;0)) = F.
The optimal uniform wholesale price is wu(k) if the entry cost is low. If the
entry cost exceeds ¯ ¯ F u(k) := π(wu(k)), then U is restricted when choosing a uniform
wholesale price. Note that ¯ F d(0) < ¯ ¯ F u(k). For intermediate values of the entry fee
the optimal uniform wholesale price is wR(F;0) which makes ﬁrm E just willing to
enter the industry. For suﬃciently high entry cost, F ≥ ˆ ˆ F, U prefers to serve only
ﬁrm I at price wd(k). The critical entry fee ˆ ˆ F is implicitly deﬁned by
w
R( ˆ ˆ F;0)
 
q(w
R( ˆ ˆ F;0) + k) + q(w




d(k) + k), (8)
where ˆ ˆ F = ˆ ˆ F(k) < ˜ F(0).
There exists an additional threshold for the entry cost that turns out to be impor-
tant to characterize the welfare implications of banning price discrimination. Since
ﬁrm I receives a discount under price discrimination, there exists an entry cost
ˇ F(k) ∈ ( ¯ ¯ F u(k), ˆ ˆ F(k)), at which the restricted wholesale price equals the discrimina-Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 11
tory wholesale price of ﬁrm I, i.e., wR( ˇ F(k);0) ≡ wd(k).12 For entry costs slightly
below ˇ F(k), price discrimination leads to (weakly) lower wholesale prices for both
ﬁrms compared to uniform pricing. For F slightly above ˇ F(k), on the other hand,
the uniform wholesale price is (weakly) below both discriminatory prices.
From the above observations, the following welfare implications follow immedi-
ately.
Proposition 2: Suppose 0 = kE < kI = k. Given (A1) and (A2), if
(i) F < ¯ ¯ F u(k), then ∆Q ≤ 0 implies ∆W < 0,
(ii) ¯ ¯ F u(k) ≤ F < ˇ F(k), then ∆W > 0,
(iii) ˇ F(k) < F < ˆ ˆ F(k), then ∆W < 0,
(iv) ˆ ˆ F(k) ≤ F < ˜ F(k), then ∆W > 0.
Cases (i), (iii), and (iv) are basically known from the previous analysis of a less
eﬃcient entrant. For very low values of the entry cost, in case (i), with the uniform
wholesale price being bracketed by the two discriminatory wholesale prices, a clear
welfare result is intricate to obtain. Nevertheless, if price discrimination does not
lead to an expansion of total output, then permitting price discrimination is harmful
for social welfare. For high-intermediate values of the entry cost, in case (iii), banning
price discrimination unambiguously improves welfare. Under both pricing regimes,
the upstream supplier serves both ﬁrms. The low restricted wholesale price, which is
necessary to induce entry, is passed on to the incumbent only under uniform pricing,
however. In case (iv), if entry is very costly, only price discrimination leads to the
opening of the new market. Thus, for high values of the entry cost the known entry-
promoting and in turn welfare-improving eﬀect of permitting price discrimination
prevails.
An interesting novelty is found in case (ii). Here, for low-intermediate values of the
entry cost, under both pricing regimes the upstream supplier is restricted in its price
setting but nevertheless induces entry. Surprisingly, a discriminatory pricing regime
leads to (weakly) lower wholesale prices for both downstream ﬁrms. In consequence,
permitting price discrimination strictly increases welfare, even though it does not
lead to more markets being served than under a ban of price discrimination. This
12Note that ¯ ¯ Fu(k) < ˇ F(k) follows immediately from wR( ˇ F(k);0) = wd(k) < wu(k) =
wR( ¯ ¯ Fu(k);0). ˇ F(k) < ˆ ˆ F(k), on the other hand, follows from the fact that it is proﬁtable
to serve both downstream ﬁrms at a price only slightly below wd(k) instead of serving only ﬁrm
I at price wd(k).12 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
eﬀect does neither occur with a less eﬃcient entrant nor if the upstream ﬁrm sells
directly to ﬁnal consumers.
5 Downstream Competition
In this section, we inquire into the implications of downstream competition for the
welfare eﬀects associated with a ban of discriminatory wholesale pricing.13 We now
assume that active downstream ﬁrms produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good and com-
pete in quantities. Thus, if ﬁrm E, which is assumed to be the less eﬃcient down-
stream ﬁrm, becomes active in the downstream industry, this is not associated with
opening of a new market but with entry into ﬁrm I’s market. Except for ﬁrms
competing ` a la Cournot in stage 3, we stick to the sequence of events introduced in
Section 2. Without further assumptions on the demand function welfare results are
hard to obtain with downstream competition. Therefore, we focus on linear demand,
i.e., P(q) = max{1 − q,0}. Moreover, we assume 0 < k < 1/2 and focus on the
case where 0 <
√
F < 1/3 − (2/3)k =: ˜ f(k). While the ﬁrst assumption guarantees
that both downstream ﬁrms produce positive quantities at the optimal unrestricted
uniform wholesale price, the latter rules out the case where U prefers to serve only
ﬁrm I under both pricing regimes.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a remark regarding the upstream supplier’s
incentives to serve the ineﬃcient entrant next to the incumbent is in order: being
restricted to linear wholesale contracts, the manufacturer’s interest in inducing entry
and thereby promoting downstream competition arises from the desire to reduce
double marginalization. If the input supplier nevertheless prefers to serve only one
downstream ﬁrm in equilibrium, then this is always the incumbent ﬁrm at wholesale
price wM = 1/2.
Suppose both downstream ﬁrms are active in equilibrium. Given the rival’s
eﬀective marginal cost cj, downstream ﬁrm i with eﬀective marginal cost ci de-
mands quantity q(ci,cj) = (1/3)(1 − 2ci − cj) and realizes gross proﬁts π(ci,cj) =
(1/9)(1−2ci−cj)2. Similar as before, for low values of the entry cost, ﬁrm E’s entry
constraint does not impose a binding restriction on U’s choice of wholesale prices.
In this case, the optimal wholesale prices under uniform pricing and under price
discrimination are wu(k) = (1/4)(2 − k) and wd(ki) = (1/2)(1 − ki), respectively.
In consequence, the entry constraint does not impose a binding restriction under
13 A detailed account of the following discussion is found in Appendix B.Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 13
uniform pricing and under price discrimination if
π(w
u(k) + k,w





















k =: ¯ f
d(k), (10)
respectively. Note that ¯ fu(k) < ¯ fd(k), i.e., the entry constraint imposes a stronger
restriction on U under uniform pricing than under price discrimination since the less
eﬃcient ﬁrm receives a discount if price discrimination is permitted.
For higher values of the entry cost,
√
F > ¯ fr(k) with r ∈ {d,u}, to make ﬁrm E
enter the downstream market U needs to oﬀer a discount wholesale price such that
ﬁrm E can just recover its ﬁxed cost. With competition ﬁrm E’s proﬁt does not
only depend on its own wholesale price but also on ﬁrm I’s wholesale price. Thus,
in contrast to the case with separate downstream markets, the restricted whole-
sale price is not necessarily identical under the two pricing regimes. The restricted
uniform wholesale price, wRu, is deﬁned by π(wRu + k,wRu) ≡ F, or equivalently,
wRu(
√
F;k) = 1 − 2k − 3
√
F. Under price discrimination, on the other hand, U
chooses two wholesale prices and thus the restricted wholesale price is not pinned
down by ﬁrm E’s binding entry constraint alone. Here, U optimally oﬀers whole-
sale price wR
I = 1/2 and wR
E(
√
F;k) = 3/4 − k − (3/2)
√
F to ﬁrm I and ﬁrm E,
respectively.
Is it always in U’s interest to serve both downstream ﬁrms? Under discrimina-
tory pricing it can be shown that U prefers to implement a downstream duopoly
if
√
F < ˜ f(k). If U is forced to oﬀer a uniform wholesale price, it prefers that
ﬁrm I monopolizes the downstream market when ﬁrm E is very ineﬃcient or when
entry costs are too high. Formally, U optimally serves both downstream ﬁrms if
√
F < ˆ f(k), where
ˆ f(k) :=
 
(1/12)[2 − 7k +
√
1 − 4k + k2] ,for k < 2 −
√
3




Note that ˆ f(k) < ˜ f(k). Hence, there exists a range of entry costs where entry occurs
under price discrimination but not under uniform pricing, i.e., price discrimination
promotes entry also when downstream ﬁrms compete. The thresholds characterized
above are depicted in Figure 3.
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Welfare Comparisons In order to compare welfare under the two pricing regimes,
we distinguish ﬁve cases with respect to the resulting downstream market structure,
as illustrated in Figure 4. We label these cases with Roman numerals, I - V.
[Insert Figure 4]
In cases I - III, both pricing regimes lead to implementation of a downstream
duopoly. Moreover, in these three cases allowing for discriminatory wholesale prices
lowers welfare. This is most obvious in case I, where both the entry fee and the
entrant’s marginal cost of production are suﬃciently low such that the input supplier
is not constrained in its choice of wholesale prices under either pricing regime.14
While total output is unaﬀected by the pricing regime, which is a direct result of
linear demand, under price discrimination the upstream supplier“subsidizes”the less
eﬃcient ﬁrm by charging a higher wholesale price to the more eﬃcient ﬁrm, thereby
(at least partly) removing the incumbent ﬁrm’s cost advantage. In consequence,
under price discrimination output is shifted from the low-cost ﬁrm to the high-
cost ﬁrm, which raises the total cost of production and thus reduces welfare. This
negative eﬀect of price discrimination on the allocation of producing the ﬁnal output
is even more severe if the upstream ﬁrm is restricted by ﬁrm E’s entry decision, since
this increases the discount the less eﬃcient entrant receives. If the entry constraint
imposes a restriction under uniform pricing, on the other hand, the lowered wholesale
price applies for all downstream ﬁrms, such that no such misallocation in production
shares occurs.15
The more interesting cases are IV and V . Here, the downstream market is mo-
nopolized under uniform pricing while under price discrimination both downstream
ﬁrms compete for ﬁnal customers. The reason is that the relatively high entry fee
and/or the relatively high marginal cost of the entrant render the concession in the
uniform wholesale price necessary to induce entry unproﬁtable for the upstream mo-
nopolist. Price discrimination, on the other hand, provides the input supplier with
a tool to proﬁtably implement a downstream duopoly even in these cases.
With separate markets, entry into the intermediate industry taking place only
under a discriminatory pricing regime but not under uniform pricing is a suﬃcient
condition for welfare to be higher under price discrimination, see Proposition 1. For
moderate values of the entry cost and a not too ineﬃcient entrant—represented
by the dark-gray shaded area in Figure 5—this result carries over to the case of
14This situation exactly corresponds to the short-run analysis in DeGraba (1990).
15Moreover, due to a lower input price, total output is increased, which in turn improves welfare
compared to the situation where the upstream ﬁrm is unrestricted under uniform pricing.Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 15
downstream competition: here, society beneﬁts from output being produced inef-
ﬁciently rather than not being produced at all. If, however, the entry fee is high
and/or the entrant is very ineﬃcient—represented by the light-gray shaded area in
Figure 5—entry becomes undesirable from a social perspective: while entry into
the downstream market alleviates the quantity distortion arising under downstream
monopoly, thereby increasing upstream proﬁts and beneﬁting consumers through
higher quantity and lower ﬁnal-good prices, the increase in aggregate output comes
at the cost of a reduction in the eﬃcient downstream ﬁrm’s output brought about
by competition in the downstream market. Thus, the increase in consumer surplus
and the upstream supplier’s proﬁts is gained at the price of burdening society with
the cost of entry and higher production costs. In consequence, since the major eﬀect
of the discriminatory pricing policy is not the creation of value but shifting rents
away from the incumbent ﬁrm to the upstream supplier, here price discrimination
leads to a strictly inferior welfare result even though market entry is promoted.






1/3 − (8/9)k ,for k ≤ 3/10
 
(23/72)k2 − (5/18)k + 17/288 ,for 3/10 < k ≤ 17/46
0 ,for k > 17/46
. (12)
With this notation we are prepared summarize the above discussion as follows:
Proposition 3: For the case with linear demand and downstream Cournot compe-
tition; (i) ∆W > 0 if ˆ f(k) ≤
√
F < fW(k) and (ii) ∆W < 0 if either
√
F < ˆ f(k)
or fW(k) <
√
F < ˜ f(k).
We refrain from an analysis of downstream competition with a more eﬃcient en-
trant. In this case, if entry occurs under price discrimination but not under uniform
pricing, production shares are shifted from the less eﬃcient to the more eﬃcient
downstream ﬁrm, i.e., in tendency overall production becomes less costly. There-
fore, in these cases, we would expect a discriminatory pricing regime to be welfare
improving more often, because one major ineﬃciency identiﬁed in the analysis of a
less eﬃcient entrant does not arise.
6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide answers to the following two questions: First, how
does potential entry into the downstream industry aﬀect wholesale prices set by an
upstream monopolist? Second, under what circumstances is banning third-degree16 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
price discrimination beneﬁcial for welfare and consumer surplus if there is potential
entry into the downstream sector?
Compared to a situation with a rigid structure of the intermediate industry, the
optimal uniform wholesale price as well as the optimal discriminatory wholesale
price charged from the potential entrant may be lower if costly entry is possible.
The optimal discriminatory wholesale price charged from incumbent ﬁrms, in con-
trast, does not depend on whether entry into the intermediate industry is possible
or not. As a consequence, when downstream ﬁrms operate in distinct markets, there
are situations—in terms of the entrant’s eﬃciency in production and the cost of
entry—where price discrimination may lead to either higher or lower prices for all
downstream ﬁrms than uniform pricing. In these cases, with wholesale prices being
clearly favorable under one of the two pricing regimes, we obtain unambiguous im-
plications of banning price discrimination regarding welfare and consumer surplus.
If downstream ﬁrms are Cournot competitors, permitting price discrimination has
the beneﬁcial eﬀect that it supports entry which in turn reduces double marginal-
ization. This beneﬁcial eﬀect, however, can be outweighed by entry being costly and
an allocative ineﬃciency in production induced by discrimination against the more
eﬃcient ﬁrm.
With costly entry being possible, these results are novel to the extant literature on
third-degree price discrimination in intermediate-good markets. Moreover, several of
the identiﬁed eﬀects are not to be obtained in a model of price discrimination in ﬁnal-
good markets. Thus, one should be wary not to hastily infer that welfare implications
valid in ﬁnal-good markets also carry over to intermediate-good markets.
A Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1:
For any wholesale price wi ≥ P(0)−ki ﬁrm i’s input demand equals zero, whereas for
wi < P(0)−ki the optimal input demand, q(ci), is strictly positive and characterized
by
MR(q(ci)) := q(ci)P
′(q(ci)) + P(q(ci)) = ci. (A.1)
Under the assumptions imposed on the inverse demand function, whenever q(ci) > 0
we have q′(ci) < 0, q′′(ci) ≤ 0, π′(ci) < 0, MR′(q) < 0 and MR′′(q) ≤ 0.
The upstream supplier’s proﬁt from charging an active downstream ﬁrm with
own marginal cost ki < P(0) a wholesale price w < P(0)−ki is Π(w;ki) := wq(w +
ki). With Π(w;ki) being strictly concave on the interval [0,P(0) − ki] the optimalPrice Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 17
unconstrained discriminatory wholesale price wd(ki) satisﬁes
q(w
d(ki) + ki) + w
d(ki)q
′(w
d(ki) + ki) = 0. (A.2)
We ﬁrst show that wd(k) < wd(0). Suppose, in contradiction, that wd(k) ≥ wd(0).









where the second equality follows from the deﬁnition of MR(q). From (A.2) it
follows that the optimal discriminatory wholesale price charged to a downstream








d(ki) + ki)). (A.4)
In consequence, wd(0) ≤ wd(k) if and only if −q(wd(0))MR′(q(wd(0))) ≤ −q(wd(k)+







′′(q(c))] < 0, (A.5)
wd(k) ≥ wd(0) implies wd(0) ≥ wd(k) + k, a contradiction. Therefore, wd(k) <
wd(0).
Knowing that wd(k) < wd(0), we next show that wd(0) < wd(k) + k. Suppose,






d(k) + k)) (A.6)
by marginal revenue being decreasing and concave. From above, we know that







d(k) + k)). (A.7)
Taken together (A.6) and (A.7) imply q(wd(k) + k) < q(wd(0)) and in consequence
wd(k) + k > wd(0), a contradiction. Thus, wd(k) + k > wd(0).
When unrestricted in its price setting, U’s proﬁt from charging a common whole-






Π(w;0) + Π(w;k) for w < P(0) − k
Π(w;0) for P(0) − k ≤ w < P(0)
0 for w ≥ P(0)
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Obviously, serving no ﬁrm clearly is not optimal. Moreover, under Assumption (A2),
it is never optimal to serve only ﬁrm I, i.e., we must have wu(k) < P(0) − k. Note
that Πu(w;k) is strictly concave on [0,P(0) − k]. By deﬁnition of wd(0) and wd(k),











for all w ∈ [0,wd(k)], which immediately implies that wd(k) < wu(k).


























where the last equality follows from deﬁnition of wd(0), and the inequality follows
from the fact that wd(0) > wd(k) and Π(w;k) being strictly concave on [0,P(0)−k].
Strict concavity of Πu(w;k) on [0,P(0)−k] then immediately implies wu(k) < wd(0),
which establishes the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We prove part (i) ﬁrst. As a preliminary consideration, consider two active down-
stream ﬁrms i and j with own marginal cost kj < ki. For w < P(0) − ki, we have
0 < q(w + ki) < q(w + kj), and q′(c) < 0 for all c ∈ [w + kj,w + ki]. The optimal
quantity demanded by a downstream ﬁrm with own marginal cost ˜ k ∈ [kj,ki] at
wholesale price w satisﬁes
P(q(w + ˜ k)) − ˜ k ≡ w − q(w + ˜ k)P
′(q(w + ˜ k)). (A.8)
Diﬀerentiation of this expression with respect to ˜ k yields
d
d˜ k
[P(q(w + ˜ k)) − ˜ k]
= −q
′(w + ˜ k)
 
P
′(q(w + ˜ k)) + q(w + ˜ k)P
′′(q(w + ˜ k))
 
< 0. (A.9)
Thus, a more eﬃcient downstream ﬁrm charges a higher mark-up.
Now, in case (i), with F < min{ ¯ F d(k), ˆ F(k)}, we always have the optimal uniform
price bracketed by the optimal discriminatory wholesale prices: for F ≤ ¯ F u(k) we
have wd(k) < wu(k) < wd(0) by Lemma 1; for F ∈ ( ¯ F u(k),min{ ¯ F d(k), ˆ F(k)})
the optimal uniform wholesale price equals wR(F;k) where wR( ¯ F u(k);k) = wu(k),
wR( ¯ F d(k);k) = wd(k), and dwR/dF < 0. Letting qd
i and qu
i denote ﬁrm i’s quantityPrice Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 19
under price discrimination and uniform pricing, respectively, where i ∈ {I,E}, this
















E − F, (A.10)





















































E = Qu(F;k), is a suﬃcient condition for ∆W(F;k) < 0.
Parts (ii) and (iii) follow immediately from the reasoning in the text.
B Downstream Competition
(Not for Publication)
In this appendix we provide a detailed analysis of the case with downstream Cournot
competition as discussed in Section 5. The equilibrium concept employed is subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. We solve the game by backward induction, beginning in
stage three.
Stage 3: For given wholesale prices and a given number of active ﬁrms in the
intermediate industry, we determine the quantities produced of the ﬁnal good by
ﬁrms active in the downstream market. If a downstream ﬁrm with own marginal
cost ki is a downstream monopolist, its demand for the input at a wholesale price w
is
q(w + ki) =
 
1−w−ki
2 for w < 1 − ki
0 for w ≥ 1 − ki
.
If two ﬁrms i and j are active in the downstream market, then ﬁrm i’s best response
at wholesale price wi given that ﬁrm j produces quantity qj is
q(qj;wi + ki) = max
 
0,
1 − wi − ki − qj
2
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For 2wi−wj < 1−2ki+kj and 2wj−wi < 1−2kj+ki the Cournot Nash equilibrium
is interior with both ﬁrms producing strictly positive quantities. The equilibrium
quantity of ﬁrm i  = j is
q(wi + ki,wj + kj) =
1 − 2(wi + ki) + (wj + kj)
3
. (B.2)
If 2wi −wj < 1−2ki +kj and 2wj −wi ≥ 1−2kj +ki, then ﬁrm j produces nothing
whereas ﬁrm i produces its monopoly quantity. For 2wi − wj ≥ 1 − 2ki + kj and
2wj − wi ≥ 1 − 2kj + ki both downstream ﬁrms produce zero quantity.
Stage 2 Given wholesale prices wI and wE charged to ﬁrm I and ﬁrm E, respec-
tively, and correctly anticipating Nash equilibrium play in stage three, ﬁrm E enters
the market if its proﬁts in the resulting market outcome in stage 3 exceed the entry
fee. If indiﬀerent between entering and not entering the market, as a tie-breaking
rule we assume that ﬁrm E behaves as the upstream supplier U wishes.16 If ﬁrm E’s
proﬁts in stage three are strictly negative, then E does not enter the intermediate
industry.
Stage 1 Correctly anticipating ﬁrm E’s entry decision in stage two and equilib-
rium play in stage three, U chooses wholesale prices wI and wE in order to maximize
upstream proﬁts. In what follows, we refer to a duopoly as a situation, in which
E enters the downstream market and downstream demand is strictly positive for
both ﬁrms I and E. Again, when indiﬀerent between implementing a downstream
duopoly or a downstream monopoly, the upstream supplier implements a down-
stream monopoly. Let Πr
{i} denote ﬁrm U’s proﬁt from implementing ﬁrm i ∈ {I,E}
as a downstream monopolist, and let Πr
{I,E} denote ﬁrm U’s proﬁt from implement-
ing ﬁrms I and E as downstream duopolists. Superscript r ∈ {d,u} again refers
to either a discriminatory pricing regime or a uniform pricing regime. Moreover,
in order not to clutter notation, we will often suppress the dependency of down-
stream quantity choices on eﬀective marginal costs as well as the dependency of
optimal wholesale prices and welfare on the entry fee and own marginal costs of the
downstream ﬁrms.
Lemma 2: Under Price discrimination,
16 We impose this alternative tie-breaking rule for expositional purposes only. Sticking to the
original tie-breaking rule, i.e., ﬁrm E enters whenever its proﬁts are nonnegative, yields exactly
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(i) if
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k, then U charges wholesale prices wd
I = wd(0) = 1/2
and wd
E = wd(k) = (1−k)/2. This implements a downstream duopoly resulting
in quantities qd
I = (1 + k)/6, qd
E = (1 − 2k)/6, and Qd = (2 − k)/6;
(ii) if (1/6) − (1/3)k <
√
F < (1/3) − (2/3)k, then U charges wholesale prices
wd
I = wR














and Qd = (1/4) + (1/2)
√
F;
(iii) if (1/3)−(2/3)k ≤
√
F, then U charges wholesale prices wd
I = wM = 1/2 and
wd
E = ∞. This implements a downstream monopoly resulting in quantities
qd
I = Qd = 1/4.
Proof:
Suppose U wants to implement a downstream duopoly. Then U chooses wholesale






1 − 2wI + (wE + k)
3
+ wE
1 − 2(wE + k) + wI
3
subject to qI =









1 − 2(wE + k) + wI
3
 2
Next, we show that for a suﬃciently low entry fee, the solution to Program D-PD is








1 − 2wI + (wE + k)
3
+ wE
1 − 2(wE + k) + wI
3
subject to 2wE − wI ≤ 1 − 2k − 3
√
F,
also solves Program D-PD.
Proof of Claim 1: First, note that the latter two constraints of Program D-PD
can equivalently be replaced by the following condition:
2wE − wI ≤ 1 − 2k − 3
√
F, (B.3)22 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
which corresponds to the one constraint in Program R. The Lagrangian associated
with Program R is
L = wI
1 − 2wI + (wE + k)
3
+ wE









With L being a strictly concave function, the associated Kuhn-Tucker conditions




1 + 2wE + k − 4wI
3




1 − 4wE − 2k + 2wI
3
− 2λ = 0
λ ≥ 0
 




2wE − wI ≤ 1 − 2k − 3
√
F
Consider the case of
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k ﬁrst. Suppose the constraint is not
binding, i.e., 2wE − wI < 1 − 2k − 3
√
F. The complementary slackness condition
then implies λ = 0. Combining the two ﬁrst-order conditions yields wholesale prices
wI = 1/2 and wE = (1−k)/2. It is readily veriﬁed that for
√
F ≤ (1/6)−(1/3)k, at
these prices the constraint of Program R is satisﬁed. Moreover, under these wholesale
prices, all remaining constraints of Program D-PD are also satisﬁed: wholesale prices
are nonnegative, and associated quantities are strictly positive, qI = (1 + k)/6 and
qE = (1 − 2k)/6. Next, consider the case (1/6) − (1/3)k <
√
F ≤ (1/2) − (2/3)k.
Suppose that the constraint is binding, i.e., 2wE − wI = 1 − 2k − 3
√
F. The
complementary slackness condition then implies λ ≥ 0. Combining the two ﬁrst-
order conditions yields wI = 1/2. Inserting this into the binding constraint leads
to wE = (3/4) − k − (3/2)
√
F. Solving for the Lagrange parameter yields λ =
(−1+2k+6
√
F)/6, which is strictly positive for (1/6)−(1/3)k <
√
F. It is readily
veriﬁed that for
√
F ≤ (1/2) − (2/3)k all remaining constraints of Program D-PD
are also satisﬁed under these wholesale prices: wholesale prices are nonnegative, and
associated quantities are strictly positive, qI = (1/4)−(1/2)
√
F and qE =
√
F. This
proves Claim 1. ||
Straightforward calculations show that U’s proﬁt from implementing a down-
stream duopoly is Πd
{I,E} = (1 − k + k2)/6 if
√






F)2 if (1/6)−(1/3)k <
√
F ≤ (1/2)−(2/3)k. Note
that for
√
F > (1/2)−(2/3)k, U’s problem becomes more heavily constrained, such
that U’s proﬁt cannot be larger than for
√
F ≤ (1/2) − (2/3)k.Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 23
Next, suppose U wants to implement a downstream monopoly. Straightforward
calculations show that the maximum proﬁt U can make when facing a downstream
monopolist with own marginal cost ki, the optimal wholesale price for U to charge
is w = (1−ki)/2, which results in downstream demand q = (1−ki)/4 and upstream
proﬁts Πd
{i} = (1 − ki)2/8. Since U’s maximum proﬁt decreases in the downstream
monopolists own marginal cost, U always prefers I to become a monopolist over E
becoming a monopolist. Since under price discrimination U can charge E a pro-
hibitively high price which keeps E out of the downstream market without aﬀecting
the price paid by the incumbent ﬁrm I, U can always make I the downstream
monopolist, resulting in upstream proﬁts of Πd
{I} = 1/8.
In order to conclude the proof of Lemma 2, we have to determine when U prefers
to implement a downstream duopoly over implementing a downstream monopoly.
If
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k, Πd
{I,E} > Πd
{I} if and only if (1 − 2k)2 > 0. Thus, if
√
F ≤ (1/6)−(1/3)k, U will implement a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities
qd
I = (1+k)/6 and qd





{I} if and only if
√
F < (1/3) − (2/3)k. Thus, if (1/6) − (1/3)k <
√
F <
(1/3) − (2/3)k, U will implement a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities
qd







F ≥ (1/3) − (2/3)k, U will
implement a downstream monopoly resulting in quantity qd
I = 1/4. This establishes
the desired result.
Lemma 3: Under uniform pricing,




F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k, then U charges a wholesale prices
wu = wu(k) = (1/2)−(1/4)k. This implements a downstream duopoly resulting
in quantities qu
I = (2 + 5k)/12, qu
E = (2 − 7k)/12, and Qu = (2 − k)/6;
(ii) if k < 2−
√




1 − 4k + k2)/12,












and Qu = k + 2
√
F;




F ≥ (1/6)−(7/12)k +(
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12, then U charges
a wholesale price wu = wM = (1/2). This implements a downstream monopoly
resulting in quantities qu
I = Qu = 1/4.
Proof:
Suppose U wants to implement a downstream duopoly. Then U chooses the uniform





2 − 2w − k
3
subject to qI =









1 − w − 2k
3
 2
First, note that if the second constraint holds also the ﬁrst constraint holds with
strict inequality, i.e., if E demands a nonnegative quantity at wholesale price w,
qE ≥ 0, then I demands a strictly positive quantity, qI > 0. Moreover, the second
and third constraint together can equivalently be replaced by the following condition:
w ≤ 1 − 2k − 3
√





2 − 2w − k
3
subject to w ≤ 1 − 2k − 3
√
F
Note that U’s objective is maximizing a strictly concave function with a unique





F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k, the optimal uniform wholesale price
that implements a downstream duopoly is w = (2 − k)/4, resulting in quantities
qI = (2+5k)/12 and qE = (2−7k)/12. Note that qE > 0—and thus also qI > 0—if
and only if k < 2/7. If
√
F > (1/6) − (7/12)k, the constraint becomes binding. If
√
F ≤ (1/3) − (2/3)k, the optimal uniform wholesale price in order to implement
a downstream duopoly is given by w = 1 − 2k − 3
√
F, resulting in quantities qI =
k +
√




F > (1/3) − (2/3)k, implementation of a downstream
duopoly with E demanding a strictly positive quantity and making nonnegative
proﬁts is not possible with a nonnegative wholesale price.
Straightforward calculations show that U’s proﬁt from implementing a down-
stream duopoly is Πu
{I,E} = (2 − k)2/24 if
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k, and Πu
{I,E} =




F) if (1/6) − (7/12)k <
√
F ≤ (1/3) − (2/3)k.
Next, suppose that U wants to implement a downstream monopoly. As noted
above, for a given wholesale price w, if E demands a nonnegative quantity, then I
demands a strictly positive quantity. Thus, under uniform pricing, the only pos-
sible form monopoly can take in the downstream market is with I as downstream
monopolist. Therefore, when implementing a downstream monopoly under uniformPrice Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 25
pricing, U has to choose a wholesale price at which E does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to enter. From above we know that this requires the wholesale price to be suﬃ-
ciently high, i.e., w > 1 − 2k − 3
√
F. Under our tie-breaking rule that E does
what U wants him to do when indiﬀerent between entering and not entering the
market, U implements a downstream monopoly whenever he chooses a wholesale
price w ≥ 1 − 2k − 3
√
F. With the quantity demanded by downstream monopolist
I being qI = (1 − w)/2, by the choice of the wholesale price U maximizes a strictly
concave function with a unique stationary point at w = 1/2 subject to the afore-
mentioned constraint. In consequence, if 1/2 ≥ 1 − 2k − 3
√
F, or equivalently, if
√
F ≥ (1/6)−(2/3)k, then the optimal wholesale price to implement a downstream




F < (1/6)−(2/3)k, then the optimal wholesale price to implement a downstream
monopoly is w = 1−2k−3
√








F). Note that w = 1−2k−3
√
F ≥ 0 if and
only if
√
F ≤ (1/3) − (2/3)k, which obviously is satisﬁed for
√
F < (1/6) − (2/3)k.
In order to conclude the proof of Lemma 3, we have to determine when U prefers
to implement a downstream duopoly over implementing a downstream monopoly.
Combining the observations obtained above, we have to distinguish four cases. (i)
If
√
F > (1/3) − (2/3)k, implementation of a downstream duopoly is not feasible.
Thus, U implements an unconstrained downstream monopoly resulting in quantity
qu
I = 1/8. (ii) If (1/6) − (7/12)k <
√












(1−8k+16k2)/48 < 0. For k < 2−
√
3, this condition implies that Πu
{I,E} > Πu
{I} if
and only if (1/6)−(7/12)k <
√
F < (1/6)−(7/12)k +(
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12, whereas
for k ≥ 2 −
√
3 we always have Πu
{I,E} ≤ Πu
{I}. Thus, U implements a downstream
duopoly resulting in quantities qu





F if k < 2 −
√
3 and
(1/6) − (7/12)k <
√
F < (1/6) − (7/12)k + (
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12, and a downstream
monopoly resulting in quantity qu
I = 1/8 otherwise. (iii) If (1/6) − (2/3)k <
√
F ≤
(1/6) − (7/12)k, where the latter inequality implies k < 2/7, then Πu
{I,E} > Πu
{I} if
and only if (2 − k)2/24 > 1/8. This latter condition implies that Πu
{I,E} > Πu
{I} if
and only if k < 2 −
√
3. Thus, U implements a downstream duopoly resulting in
quantities qu
I = (2+5k)/12 and qu
E = (2−7k)/12 if k < 2−
√
3 and (1/6)−(2/3)k <
√




F ≤ (1/6) − (2/3)k, which implies k ≤ 1/4, then Πu
{I,E} >
Πu







F)2 + ((4k − 1)/3)
√
F + (7k − 2)2/108 > 0. This latter inequality always holds
for k < 2 −
√
3, and thus is always satisﬁed in the case under consideration. Thus,26 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
U implements a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities qu
I = (2 + 5k)/12 and
qu
E = (2 − 7k)/12. This establishes the desired result.
Proposition 4: (i) W d > W u if and only if
(1.) k < 2 −
√
3 and (1/6) − (7/12)k + (
√
1 − 4k − k2)/12 ≤
√




3 ≤ k ≤ 3/10 and
√
F < (1/3) − (8/9)k, or




(23/72)k2 − (5/18)k + (17/288).
(ii) W d < W u if and only if




F < (1/6) − (7/12)k + (
√
1 − 4k − k2)/12, or
(2.)
√




(23/72)k2 − (5/18)k + (17/288) for k ≥ 3/10, and
√




F ≥ (1/3) − (2/3)k, then W d = W u.
Proof:




1 − 4k + k2)/12 < (1/3)−
(2/3)k, (1/6) − (7/12)k + (
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12 = (1/6) − (1/3)k if and only if k =
(
√
3−1)/4, and (1/6)−(7/12)k +(
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12 = (1/6)−(7/12)k if and only
if k = 2 −
√
3. These observations together with Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that there
are ﬁve cases to consider that we labeled with Roman numerals in Figure 6.




F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k:
Under both pricing regimes, U implements an unconstrained downstream
duopoly, resulting in the same aggregate output, Qd = Qu = (2−k)/6. Under
price discrimination, however, the less eﬃcient ﬁrm E produces a higher share
of output, qd
E = (1−2k)/6 > (2−7k)/12 = qu
E. Thus, welfare is strictly lower
under price discrimination than under uniform pricing, W d < W u.
(II) k < 2 −
√
3, (1/6) − (7/12)k <
√
F < (1/6) − (7/12)k + (
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12,
and
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k:
Under price discrimination, U implements an unconstrained duopoly resulting
in quantities qd
I = (1+k)/6, qd
E = (1−2k)/6, and Qd = (2−k)/6, whereas under
uniform pricing, U implements a constrained duopoly, resulting in quantities
qu





F, and Qu = k + 2
√
F. (1/6) − (7/12)k <
√
F
implies that aggregate output is larger under uniform pricing than under pricePrice Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare 27
discrimination, Qd < Qu.
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k, on the other hand, implies,
that the less eﬃcient ﬁrm’s output is (at least weakly) lower under uniform
pricing than under price discrimination. Together, these observations imply
that welfare under uniform pricing exceeds welfare under price discrimination,
W d < W u.
(III) k < (
√




1 − 4k + k2)/12:
Under both pricing regimes, U implements a constrained duopoly. Under price
discrimination, this results in in quantities qd






and Qd = (1/4) + (1/2). Under uniform pricing, the resulting quantities
are qu





F, and Qu = k + 2
√
F. While the less eﬃcient





(1/6) − (1/3)k ≤
√
F implies that aggregate output is higher under uniform
pricing than under price discrimination, Qd < Qu. This, in turn, implies
that welfare under uniform pricing exceeds welfare under price discrimination,
W d < W u.
(IV) (1/6)−(1/3)k <
√
F < (1/3)−(2/3)k and (1/6)−(7/12)k+(
√




Under price discrimination, U implements a constrained downstream duopoly,
resulting in quantities qd





F, and Qd = (1/4) +
(1/2)
√





(1 − x)dx − kq
d
















Under uniform pricing, on the other hand, U implements an unconstrained
downstream monopoly with I as the downstream monopoly ﬁrm, resulting in
quantity qu









With F > 0, W d > W u if and only if
√
F < (1/3) − (8/9)k. Obviously,
for all k ∈ (0,0.5) we have (1/3) − (8/9)k < (1/3) − (2/3)k. Moreover, for
k ∈ (0,2 −
√
3], (1/3) − (8/9)k > (1/6) − (7/12)k + (
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12. Last,
note that (1/3) − (8/9)k and (1/6) − (1/3)k intersect at k = 0.3. Thus,
W d > W u if and only if k < 0.3 and (1/6) − (1/3)k <
√
F, (1/6) − (7/12)k +
(
√




F < (1/3) − (8/9)k.




F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k, and
√
F ≥ (1/6) − (7/12)k +
(
√
1 − 4k + k2)/12 for k ∈ [(
√
3 − 1)/4,2 −
√
3):28 Fabian Herweg & Daniel M¨ uller
Under price discrimination, U implements an unconstrained duopoly resulting
in quantities qd
I = (1 + k)/6, qd
E = (1 − 2k)/6, and Qd = (2 − k)/6. Welfare





(1 − x)dx − kq
d
E − F =
20 − 20k + 23k2
72
− F. (B.7)
Under uniform pricing, on the other hand, U implements an unconstrained
downstream monopoly with I as the downstream monopoly ﬁrm, resulting in
quantity qu









Thus, W d > W u if and only if F < (23/72)k2 −(5/18)k +(17/288) =: FW(k).
Note that FW(k) > 0 for k < 17/46 and FW(k) ≤ 0 for k ∈ [17/46,0.5]. With
FW(k) > 0 for k < 17/46, it is readily veriﬁed that d
 
FW(k)/dk < 0 for
k ≤ 17/46. Moreover,
 
FW(k) = (1/6)−(1/3)k if and only if k = 0.3. Thus,




F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k.
Last, for
√
F ≥ (1/3) − (2/3)k U implements a downstream monopoly with I as
the downstream monopoly ﬁrm under both pricing regimes, resulting in quantity
qd
I = qu
I = Qd = Qu = 1/4. Thus, there is no diﬀerence in welfare under both
pricing regimes, W d = W u. Combining these observations establishes the desired
result.
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